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Abstract
For a firm financed by a mixture of collateralized (short-term) debt and uncollateralized
(long-term) debt, we show that fluctuations in margin requirements, reflecting funding liquidity
shocks, lead to increasing firm’s default risk and credit spreads. The severity with which a
firm is hit by increasing margin requirements highly depends on both its financing structure
and debt maturity structure. Our results imply that an additional premium should be added
when evaluating debt in order to account for rollover risks especially for short-matured bonds.
In terms of policy implications our results strongly indicate that regulators should intervene
fast to curtail margins in crisis periods and maintain a reasonably low margin level in order to
effectively prevent creditors’ run on debt.
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1 Introduction
Ever since the liquidity crisis in the credit turmoil 2007/2008 and the subsequent European debt cri-
sis, the importance of an adequate measurement and management of the risk inherent in short-term
financing has been recognized by both financial institutions and regulators. Crises have witnessed
how funding liquidity dry-ups in the lending market lead to increasing rollover costs of collateral-
ized short-term debt and hence trigger early bank runs and firm failures. Such bankruptcies differ
considerably from those due to insolvency. When investors loose confidence in a firm’s ability to
repay due debt obligations, they ask for higher margin for risk sharing.1 In normal times, margins
are low and the collateral value is mainly determined by the firm’s fundamental value (resp. by
the firm’s credit worthiness). In distressed periods, however, a change in the margin rate has a
great impact on the collateral value. The latest financial crisis, for instance, has seen an abrupt
upward jump in the margin rate which was mostly caused by market imperfections rather than
by deriorations in firms’ fundamental value directly. For example, when Lehman Brothers filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008, its total assets were well above total
liabilities. Negative externalities, however, caused the margin rate to soar up even though the un-
derlying fundamental value was perfoming reasonably well. When margins increase, firms can raise
less funds as they need to provide more collateral for borrowing and thus are exposed to funding
liquidity problems. Thus, fluctuations in margin reflecting changes in funding liquidity play a very
important role in explaining firms’ default risk and credit spread during crisis periods.
In this paper we present a structural credit risk model that takes into account fluctuating margin
requirements and thereby allows to study how a liquidity shock, arising from margin variations in
the collateralized short-term lending market, affects debt credit spread. We consider a firm financed
by a mixture of long- and short-term debt reflecting a realistic debt structure. Short-term debt is
collateralized and needs to be rolled over periodically. At each rollover date, the margin rate in
short-term debt contracts is adjusted to the current market conditions and to the firm fundamental
value. We consider an average margin that is an aggregate margin rate on the whole pledged assets
rather than a specific margin rate on one asset class. The margin needs to be marked to market
and hence can expose a firm to high funding liquidity risk at the rollover dates of short-term debt
when margins fluctuate. In the sequel, we use both terms margin and average margin interchange-
ably.2 Long-term debt is locked until maturity and hence does not contribute to the firm’s exposure
to funding liquidity risk. We are particularly interested in how a liquidity shock, reflected by an
upward jump in the initial margin requirement, as well as the length of a crisis period affect the
firm’s default risk and credit spread. We therefore model the time-varying margin as an exogenous
mean-reverting random process which is negatively correlated with the firm’s fundamental value.
Thus, when the fundamental value is low corresponding to firm’s low credit worthiness, the margin
tends to be high which in turn leads to even worse collateral values. On top of this, the margin
is also affected by exogenous market shocks which can lead to increasing credit spreads even if
1Margin, also called haircut, is a percentage cut from the value of assets that are used as collateral to borrow. For
example, when a firm pledges assets worth 100 dollars as collateral but can only borrow 80 dollars, the margin
rate is 100−80
100
= 20% , meaning that 20% is sliced off from the assets’ value. Margin is dependent on both quality
of collateral and moral hazard of creditors.
2High quality collateral such as high rated bonds has small variation under normal market conditions. However,
typical margins on asset-backed securities and structural products can be high as 20% − 25% even in normal times
(see “The role of margin requirements and haircuts in procyclicality”, CGFS Papers, No 36).
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the firm’s fundamental value is performing well. Thus, when either a negative systemic shock or a
negative idiosyncratic shock arrives, the margin increases, reflecting creditor’s concerns about the
firm’s ability to repay due debt, which in turn yields an increase in debt credit spread. The firm
defaults due to illiquidity if margin requirements are too high for it to roll over short-term debt.
Hence, our model allows for two different default scenarios. On the one hand, the firm defaults due
to insolvency when the firm fundamental value falls below an exogenous default threshold which
depends on the firm’s total liabilities as modelled in the classical structural credit risk models. On
the other hand, when the firm is unable to roll over short-term debt as margin deteriorates, this
triggers the firm’s default due to funding liquidity risk inherent in its financing structure.
Our paper contributes to the literature on funding liquidity risk in various aspects. First, our
results show that margin requirements in firm’s financing can be significant in explaining default
probabilities and credit spreads. When margins increase, firm’s credit spreads tend to increase
and this increase is more pronounced for those firms heavily relying on short-term financing or
with high rollover frequency of short-term debt. When the lending conditions deteriorate, the
probability of a default due to tight margin requirements increases quickly and can eventually
dominate the probability of an insolvency default. Such defaults can be understood as debt runs
as discussed in Covitz et al. (2013), Acharya et al. (2013), and Schroth et al. (2014). Their papers
show that soaring credit spread on debt accompanied runs on short-term financial instruments,
e.g., when creditors ran on asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP) starting in August 2007, on
repo in September 2007, and on money market mutual funds in September 2008. This provides
evidence that margin is an important variable in firm’s internal risk management, especially for
firms with large fractions of short-term debt. To gauge size of secured short-term debt market,
Covitz et al. (2013) documents by the end of 2006, ABCP outstanding in the United States has
grown up to $1.1 trillion, larger than the amount of unsecured (non-asset-backed) commercial paper
(provided to firms with high-quality debt ratings) outstanding. While the repo market operating
mostly over-the-counter is short of official statistics, its volume is estimated to roughly $12 trillion
(see Gorton and Metrick (2012)). Hence, our model is especially suitable for financial institution
relying on short-term lending, as for instance commercial paper conduits, or more general banks
in the shadow banking system.3 Our model for quantifying firm’s default risk caused by tight-
ened margin requirements is easy to implement. It encourages firms to collect margin rate data
on each class of collateral which can then be used to calibrate our model for the average margin rate.
Secondly, we show that the variation in margin requirements over short time periods is very
important to explain firm’s default probability and credit spread. Schroth et al. (2014) show that
time-varying spread on debt typically makes debt runs more likely. Since determining spreads on
collateralized short-term debt is equivalent to setting margin requirements as argued in Danielson
et al. (2012), this indicates that time-variations in margins lead to increased firm’s default risk. The
existing literature on the liquidity constraint or margin constraint assumes a constant margin level.
In contrast, we model the margin as a time-varying process to show the innovation to the changing
3Former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke provided a definition in April 2012 at the 2012 Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets Conference: ”Shadow banking, as usually defined, comprises a diverse set of
institutions and markets that, collectively, carry out traditional banking functions–but do so outside, or in ways only
loosely linked to, the traditional system of regulated depository institutions. Examples of important components of
the shadow banking system include securitization vehicles, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, money
market mutual funds, markets for repurchase agreements (repos), investment banks, and mortgage companies.”
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lending condition. We find that a negative liquidity shock in the initial margin, representing a
sharp disruption in the credit market, can lead to an increase in credit spread compared to the case
of a constant margin level.
Third, our model provides a theoretical foundation that an additional discount factor for liquid-
ity risk should be implemented when evaluating debt in classical structural credit risk models. As
pointed out by Danielson et al. (2012), slacking the margin requirement in purchasing an asset is
equivalent to increasing the premium. Similarly, our result implies that a funding liquidity premium
should be paid to the creditors in order to compensate them for bearing the firm’s rollover risk.
Such an idea has been advocated as so-called liquidity-transfer-pricing e.g. in Financial Stability
Institute (2011) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008a). With regard to interest
rate derivatives, the basis spread difference for two different maturities (also called tenor spread
difference) has attained a lot of attention (see, e.g., Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) and Filipović
and Trolle (2013)). However, taking into account liquidity premia in debt evaluation has been
discussed much less. He and Xiong (2012) add a constant liquidity premium to the discount rate
when pricing debt. Their model forecasts a severe increase in the credit spread for debt when
the liquidity premium increases which is consistent with our results when the margin requirement
becomes tighter. Our results, however, further indicate that the premium should be different for
creditors lending at different maturities. Moreover, while He and Xiong (2012) consider market
liquidity, our model investigates funding liquidity risk inherent in the short-term lending market.
In this sense, our paper also bears similarity with the bank run models of Morris and Shin (2010)
and Liang et al. (2014). While these models assume lending conditions to be constant, in this paper
we include fluctuations in margin requirements, an essential factor in the financial crisis and the
European debt crisis.
Finally, our model has some important implications for monetary policy. Our results show that
the faster a central bank intervenes when market is in distress, the sooner the market will restore
to the normal conditions. More explicitly, when the central bank provides funding at a generous
margin such that the market induced margin can also adjust to a normal level, credit spreads on
debt will drop quickly to a normal level as well. These quantitative experiments indicate that a firm
should carefully maintain a reasonable level of margin on its debt in signs of soaring credit spread
on debt.4 They also support what has been suggested e.g. in Ashcraft et al. (2010), Geanakoplos
(2010), Gibson and Murawski (2013), and Liang et al. (2014), that margins should be well moni-
tored by firms and regulators. Ashcraft et al. (2010) show that the traditional monetary instrument
of cutting interest rates to lower the expected return on capital, actually increases attractiveness of
leveraged investments through increasing shadow costs of capital. In other words, reducing interest
rates enhances short-term lending as short-term funding becomes cheaper, which however might
further increase financial distress through higher rollover risk. A more effective way is to combine
both tools, i.e., lower interest rates and provide lending at a more generous haircut. In fact, it
has been shown in Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) and Geanakoplos (2010) that lowering margin
through lending facilities had significantly decreased the required return during the financial crisis.
4Our model investigates how a specific company can reduce its risk exposure to a funding liquidity shock and
studies how the firm can benefit from a managed margin in distressed periods. The model, however, does not deal
with the risky counterparty since we do not model the creditors that provide funding. Thus, our model cannot
address quantitative easing and its implications in currency rate depreciation, inflation, and many others. Taking
these systemic effects into account is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future work.
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Our model shows that a firm does benefit from the quickly restored lending condition in distress
and hence enhances this argument.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses
the default mechanism. Section 3 examines the effects of funding liquidity on a firm’s default
probability and credit spread. Section 4 discusses the implications of our model while Section 5
concludes. Appendix A provides details on the numerical method used in the implementation.
2 The Model
2.1 Firm’s Assets






under the risk-neutral measure Q , where rf is the risk-free rate, σ is the volatility to firm fun-
damental and (W 1t )t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion under Q representing shocks to the firm
fundamental.
2.2 Debt Structure
Suppose the firm finances its risky assets by a mixture of collateralized short-term debt and uncol-
lateralized long-term debt as well as equity.5 Long-term debt has an aggregate principal of L and
maturity T associated with the continuously paid coupon CL . Short-term debt, consisting e.g.
of commercial papers and repo transactions, has to be rolled over periodically until time T . At
time t0 short-term debt has an aggregate principal of S and maturity t1 . Short-term debt can
successively be rolled over at each date tn for n = 1, . . . , N − 1 with
0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tN−1 < tN = T .
The coupon associated with short-term debt is assumed to be constant CS over time.
6 Hence, at
any rollover date tn , n = 1, . . . , N − 1 , the firm replaces the maturing bonds by newly issued
bonds with the same face value S and coupon rate CS maturing at the next date tn+1 .
The secured short-term borrowing requires the firm to pledge its assets as collateral. Therefore,
the creditors impose margin requirements on the firm for risk sharing, i.e., when assets are used
as collateral for borrowing a certain fraction, the margin or haircut, is cut off from the asset’s
5Our analysis can easily be extended towards a finer financing structure where a fraction of both short- and
long-term debt is secured and the rest is unsecured. A finer debt financing structure would, however, only change
the payoff for both types of creditors. This would only shift the default probability as a funding liquidity default in
our model is defined as an event where assets are not sufficient to collateralize short-term borrowing. Therefore, our
main results, induced by an illiquidity default, would stay unchanged. Furthermore, we do not specify exactly the
financing sources of the firm. Instead, we only assume that the short-term debt borrowing is colleteralized as is the
case e.g. in repos and commercial papers, which expose a firm to high funding liquidity risk.
6The endogenized short-debt coupon incorporating liquidity risk has been studied in Lütkebohmert et al. (forth-
coming) and Schroth et al. (2014).
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value. Assume that the firm pledges its entire assets as collateral to raise funds7 and denote the
margin rate negotiated at time t by mt . Note that the margin in this sequel is taken as average
margin rate on the whole class of collateralized debts. Thus, it depends on the credit rating of all
pledged assets but besides also needs to be adjust to market conditions. At each rollover date tn ,
n = 1, . . . , N − 1 , the firm can then borrow up to
(1−mtn)Vtn
by pledging its risky assets as collateral. Most of the existing literature assumes the margin to be
given as a constant exogenous parameter. This, however, is not able to capture the risk inherent in
reliance on collateralized short-term funding. When margin requirements change, this can have a
dramatic effect on the refinancing situation of a firm. Therefore, we consider time-varying margin in
our setting to reflect changing market conditions. In particular, we introduce time-varying margin
as a mean-reverting process
dmt = κ(θ −mt)dt+ ηmtdW 2t (2.2)
under the risk neutral measure, where κ is the speed with which the margin converges to its
long-run mean θ and η is the volatility of the margin. (W 2t )t≥0 is another standard Brownian
motion under Q with Cov(W 1t ,W 2t ) = ρt . The correlation ρ shows the co-movement between
firm fundamental and margin driven by the common market factor.8 We assume the correlation to
be negative indicating that the firm fundamental value is procyclical while the margin is counter-
cyclical.9 The choice of a mean-reversion process is motivated in our setting as we are particularly
interested in investigating a firm’s resilience to a liquidity crisis in the short end. In particular,
we study how a high initial margin requirement as well as the speed of mean reversion parameter
affect the firm’s credit spread. Furthermore, we are also interested in the question of what mone-
tary policy tools might help to strengthen firm’s resilience to periods of financial instability. It is
not the aim of this paper to study how potential future crisis periods might influence the firm’s
default risk. In the long-run margins will fluctuate around the mean level θ in our setting. Hence,
margins are still time-varying in the long-run but liquidity shocks are rather unlikely. Thus, our
model does not account for the effects of potential future crisis periods.
Remark 1. Note that margin in our model is thought of as a weighted average of margin require-
ments on all collateral rather than the one imposed on a certain class of securities in the market.
When creditors are pessimistic about the firm’s ability to repay debt, a higher margin would be
asked on average although the margin for some security classes with high credit rating might stay
7The reason is that in our setting a default due to extremely tight margin requirements occurs when the firm’s
assets are not enough to sustain short-term financing profile. Hence, before defaulting, the firm would first use all
available assets as collateral. If also a fraction of long-term debt is collateralized by some assets, the residual assets
would be used as collateral for short-term debt resulting in a shift in the default probability.
8If the firm’s expected mean return is a constant, denoted by µ , we can propose the market prices of risk to firm









respectively. The particular choice of market prices of risk maintains the geometric Brownian motion dynamics of
the firm fundamental and the continuous GARCH(1,1) dynamics of the margin.
9The countercyclical margin is motivated by the work of Adrian and Shin (2014) who show that leverage is
procyclical and thus, margin as the reciprocal of leverage is countercyclical versus the firm’s asset value.
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unchanged. Therefore, with changes of lending conditions and firm fundamental value, firm is po-
tentially exposed to a great of variations in margin process.
Remark 2. In our model, we take the dynamics of the margin rate as exogenously given. The
margin is, of course, heavily affected by the firm’s credit quality. In our setting, this is reflected
through the negative correlation between margin and firm fundamental value. However, changes in
margin requirements can also be caused by factors independent from firm fundamental value due
to negative externality, for instance, the incentivized fraud that the excess returns that become
available with extreme leverage (regardless of the fundamentals of the underlying asset) create
overwhelming, short-term incentives for fraud. A negative shock such as the announcement of
bankruptcy of a major bank or downgrade of government bonds potentially leads to an increase
in margin. In our model, we study how such variations in margins and debt financing structure
together with deviations in the firm’s fundamental value determine the firm’s default risk.
2.3 Default and Recovery
There are two channels triggering firm’s default in our model. First, deteriorations in the firm’s
fundamental value can trigger an insolvency default. Following Black and Cox (1976), this happens
at the first passage time
τi = inf{t > 0|Vt ≤ B},
where B is an exogenously given insolvency threshold depending on the firm’s liabilities.
Secondly, when liquidity dries up in the collateralized short-term debt market, margin as a
confidence barometer in the lending market can rocket up to a level so high that the firm is unable
to roll over short-term debt, i.e., the funds the firm can raise by pledging its assets as collateral,
(1−mt)Vt , are less than the short-term debt S that needs to be rolled over. The highest margin





Thus, if the realized margin mtn at a rollover date tn is higher than m
∗
tn , the firm defaults due
to illiquidity as it cannot roll over its short-term funding. Consequently, the firm defaults due to
illiquidity at
τm = inf{tn ∈ {t1, . . . , tN−1}|(1−mtn)Vtn < S}.
Hence, this type of default happens when a liquidity shock hits the firm and the firesale price
(1−mτm)Vτm of the firm fundamental is not sufficient for the firm to maintain the short-term debt
profile even though the firm fundamental value Vτm at that time can be well above the insolvency
threshold. Such a default is equivalent to a default due to creditors’ run on short-term debt. Absent
of a funding liquidity shock, the short-term creditors renew debt every period until time T .10
10Note that if some short-term creditors were to withdraw their funding for idiosyncratic reasons, the firm will
always be able to find new creditors to replace them as long as there is no systematic funding liquidity shock.
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Remark 3. In principle, the firm can also decide not to roll over some short-term debt and sell
some assets. In that way, short-term debt principal S becomes smaller and thus through the
above mechanism the default time τm tends to be later. We ignore this possibility in our model
as asset liquidation is usually costly in periods of market distress which tend to be accompanied
by high margins.
The firm’s default time is therefore given by the minimum of insolvency and illiquidity default
time
τ = min{τm, τi},
whatever happens first, and the firm’s default probability at time t can be calculated as
PD(t) = Q (τ ≤ T |Ft) ,
where Q denotes the risk-neutral measure and Ft contains the available information at time t .
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 illustrates the default mechanism in our model. It shows a typical simulation of firm
fundamental value (Vt)t≥0 (solid line) and collateral value ((1 − mt)Vt)t≥0 (dashed line). The
dotted line represents the insolvency default barrier B while the dash-dotted line illustrates the
short-term debt principal level S . The insolvency threshold B is constant over time and the firm
defaults due to insolvency when the firm fundamental value drops below the threshold level B . In
contrast, the margin is time-varying and the firm defaults due to illiquidity when the firesale price
of assets drops below the nominal of short-term debt S . In Figure 1, the value of the collateral
falls below the short-term debt principal already after about 3 months triggering an early illiquidity
default of the firm, while the firm fundamental value drops below the insolvency barrier much later
in time.
Remark 4. Both firm fundamental, representing the availability of collateral, and margin as an
indicator of the firm’s collateralized borrowing capacity, are exogenous to our model and make
default modelling straightforward. On the one hand, this avoids having to consider creditors’
decision problem at every rollover decision date (see Morris and Shin (2010) and Liang et al. (2014))
and thereby dramatically simplifies numerical implementation. On the other hand, however, the
fact that we have two types of debt and more than one state variable prevents us from endogenizing
the threshold at which an illiquidity default occurs (see Schroth et al. (2014)).
Remark 5. A more general financing structure allowing for both collateralized and uncollateralized
short- and long-term debt does not change the above described default mechanism. It might ex-
pose the firm to higher funding liquidity risk dependent on the exact financing structure though.
Consider e.g. the case where a fraction of short-term debt is uncollateralized and suppose margin
requirements in the collateralized lending market tighten. The unsecured short-term creditors will
then hoard liquidity and will likely not roll over due debt (compare Acharya and Skeie (2011))
triggering a higher illiquidity default probability. A similar phenomenon can be observed in case
long-term debt is also collateralized by a fraction of the firm’s assets. Suppose that margin grad-
ually increases such that more and more assets are required as collateral until finally the entire
firm assets are depleted. The scarcity of collateral then only exaggerates the likelihood of a default
caused by tightened margin requirements (funding liquidity shock).
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Denote by V̄τ the recovery value of the firm’s assets at default time τ . In the case of a default
triggered by a funding liquidity shock, the value of liquidated assets through firesales is
V̄τ = V̄τm = (1−mτm)Vτm .
In the case of an insolvency default, the value of liquidated asset is
V̄τ = V̄τi = RB,
where R denotes the recovery rate which is assumed to be exogenously given. 1 −mτm can be
understood as the firesale rate in a liquidity crisis. It is usually smaller than the recovery rate R
because the nominal short-term debt principal is less than the insolvency default threshold. This
reflects the huge loss a firm suffers in case of a market-wide liquidity crisis.
2.4 Debt Evaluation
In case of default, the collateralized debt holders receive the recovery value from the liquidated
assets first and the uncollateralized debt holders obtain what is left. Equity holders get nothing
since they are the residual claimants and the firm’s liquidation value will not be sufficient to pay
off all creditors.


















where expectations are calculated under the risk-neutral measure Q and the subscript t indicates
conditioning on available information at time t . The first term in (2.3) is the present value of
coupon payments before default or maturity. The second term is the present value of principal when
there is no default prior to maturity. The third term is the present value of the liquidated assets
distributed to the long-term creditors in an insolvency default in which the short-term creditors
receive the recovered value first. In case of a default due to a funding liquidity shock, nothing is
left to the long-term creditors because the liquidated assets are worth less than the outstanding
short-term debt principal.






















The first two terms have the same interpretation as in (2.3) . The last two terms are the present
values of the liquidated assets distributed to the collateralized short-term creditors in case of an
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insolvency default and a funding liquidity default, resp.
Given the debt values in (2.3) and (2.4) , the debt yield yj , computed as the equivalent




(1− eyj(T−t)) + je−yj(T−t) (2.5)
for j ∈ {L, S} . The difference between debt yield and the risk-free rate gives the credit spread on
the firm’s debt and will be analyzed in detail in the next section.
3 Numerical Results
3.1 Model Parameters
We calibrate our model to parameters used in the related literature on structural credit risk models.
We set the risk-free rate equal to 3% . For the sensitivity analysis we choose an initial asset value
equal to V0 = 100 monetary units. The volatility of the firm’s assets is set to σ = 25% as in
Zhang et al. (2009). We choose the recovery rate R = 50% . Custódio et al. (2013) argue that the
average of debt maturity is 6 years if debt expirations are uniformly distributed. Financial firms
tend to have shorter debt maturities as they rely heavily on repo transactions with maturities from
one day to three months and commercial papers with maturities of less than 9 months. Therefore,
we assume the maturity of long-term debt to be T = 5 years. For short-term debt we assume a
rollover frequency of 3 months.
[Table 1 about here.]
We set the long-term debt principal to 40 monetary units with a continuously paid coupon of
3.8 monetary units. Short-term debt principal is 20 monetary units with coupon of 1.8 monetary
units. This implies that the coupon rate on long-term debt equals the risk-free rate plus 650 bps
and the coupon rate on short-term debt equals the risk-free rate plus 600 bps. Throughout our
analysis, we keep the total debt outstanding fixed as 60 monetary units and the coupon rate to
every type of debt is constant. In our baseline parameter we set the default threshold B = 44.58
monetary units which yields a credit spread for debt of around 230 basis points based on our
model. The number lies in the range on credit spread for investment grade and speculative grade.
Essentially, it is chosen to have a benchmark model to compare with.
Market data on margins unfortunately is not publicly available. However, there are financial
institutions collecting margin data (see e.g. Geanakoplos (2010)), and there are reports from banks
revealing margin requirements for some asset classes in certain periods.11 The Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) and the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP), announced
in early 2009, provide bond lending at exactly 50% margin. The latter is an intermediate level
between the 5% margin required at the peak of the leverage bubble and the 70 − 90% margin
demanded during the crisis in 2008. Since then, the asset market enjoyed a sound rebound in prices
11See, e.g., “International banking and financial market developments”, BIS Quarterly Review December 2011, or
“The role of margin requirements and haircuts in procyclicality”, CGFS Papers, No 36
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and the bond market saw a solid drop. Therefore, we choose an initial margin of m0 = 10% . Anal-
ogously to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), we set the long-run mean of the margin θ = 10%
which is usually understood as the normal margin level in boom times. When margin converts to its
long-run mean with rate κ = 1.5 , we set η = 1.2 such that the unconditional standard variation
of margin is 9.6% reflecting its low variation in normal times.12 The rate κ = 1.5 implies a rel-
atively slow mean reverting margin process, which means a shock takes about 252 log 2/1.5 = 116
days to halve the deviation of margin from its long-run mean.13 The speed of mean reversion κ
indicates the duration of the liquidity crisis period in our model as it describes how quickly the
margin is falling back to a normal level. The firm fundamental and its margin requirement are
affected by the common market factor. The correlation between the two driving processes is as-
sumed to be ρ = −50%. 14 The sensitivity of our results with respect to the parameters of the
mean-reverting margin process will be discussed in the next subsection. Table 1 summarizes these
baseline parameters of our numerical analysis. In the following default probabilities and credit
spreads are calculated under the risk-neutral measure according to the change of measure outlined
in footnote 8. Implementation is based on Monte Carlo method with 10,000 simulations. Details
on the simulation of first passage times can be found in A.
3.2 Default Probability
The margin is a bilateral agreement between a firm and its lenders asking for collateral on either
commercial papers or over-the-counter repo contracts. It measures the firm’s capability to borrow,
which is a credential characteristic of a firm. The higher the margin is, the less confidence the
lending market has in a firm’s ability to repay debt principal and coupons. Panel A in Figure 2 dis-
plays that the total default probability with respect to both daily and quarterly rollover frequency
increases in the initial margin but not dramatically when the initial margin is less than 25% . The
total default probability, however, starts to pick up quickly for higher initial margins of 25-50%.
This is caused by the fact that the default probability due to illiquidity increases very fast while the
default probability due to insolvency flattens out when the initial margin is larger than 25% , as
shown in Panel B. Note that the default probability due to illiquidity is defined as the probability
that the firm’s default time due to illiquidity occurs earlier than the one due to insolvency. In other
words, the firm’s bankruptcy is caused by a funding liquidity shock while its asset value is still high
enough for the firm to be considered solvent. The default time due to insolvency is analogously
defined. Therefore, for a firm relying on short-term borrowing, the tightened funding condition
can increase the firm’s default risk greatly even if it holds high quality assets. Reports have shown
that during the European debt crisis the market margin on mortgage-backed, asset-backed, and
structural securities was well above 50% . The abruptly soaring margin upto a level of 50% leads
to a situation where the default probability due to illiquidity dominates the default probability
12The unconditional variance of m1 is given by θ
2/(2κ/η2 − 1) = 0.923% such that the unconditional standard
deviation of margin is 9.6% (compare (Barone-Adesi et al., 2005), equation (6) on p. 290, for reference).
13Note that the expectation of mt is given by E0[mt] = θ + (m0 − θ)e−κt . Thus, the condition E0[mt] − θ =
1
2
(m0 − θ) implies that 1/2 = e−κt or equivalently log 2/κ = t where t is measured in units of years. Hence, the
half life can be computed as 252 log 2/κ days.
14Negative correlation means the firm fundamental value tends to be low when margin is high and vice versa. Total
default probability however increases slightly in negative ρ . This is because a default in our model is determined
by both the firm fundamental value V and the collateral value (1 − m)V . Further, the correlation between an
illiquidity default and an insolvency default is determined by the correlation between V and (1 −m)V .
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due to insolvency as shown in Panel B of Figure 2.15 The lenders’ confidence collapsed and the
private lending activity basically stopped before ECB stepped up to rescue. In boom times, the
funding liquidity risk is small and even negligible with very loose margin requirement. However,
when market switches into regime of distress with significantly high margin, our results show that
the default probability of a firm can dramatically increase even if the firm fundamental performs
well.
Figure 2 further demonstrates that the more frequently the short-term debt needs to be rolled
over, the higher the firm’s default probability is as the firm is exposed to higher rollover risk. Espe-
cially in the limiting case when debt is rolled over on a daily basis, the default probability caused
by illiquidity completely dominates the one due to insolvency when the initial margin is higher than
30% . This leads to a dramatic increase in the total default probability. A similar phenomenon
has been found in He and Xiong (2012). Therefore, these results imply that firm’s should account
for potential fluctuations in margin requirements in their internal risk management processes as
tightened margins can cause huge losses for firms relying on short-term borrowing.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 3 shows that the insolvency default probability is invariant against changes of short-
term debt since the insolvency default barrier is chosen constant. The total default probability and
illiquidity default probability, however, increase in short-term debt financing and can weigh out
the insolvency risk if short-term funds are over-used. This implies that a firm’s financing structure
significantly affects the firm’s default risk. Especially when the firm is financed mostly through
short-term collateralized borrowing, its default risk due to funding liquidity can be quite substan-
tial. This issue will be further discussed in Section 3.3.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Finally, Table 2 shows that the default probability due to a funding liquidity shock is increasing
in negative correlation ρ for financing structures with different short-term debt ratios SS+L . For
a firm heavily relying on short-term debt, this even causes the total default probability to ascend
with negative correlation. We have asserted earlier that higher negative correlation between firm
fundamental value and margin dynamics makes defaults more likely as margins tend to be high
when the firm firm fundamental value is already low. The results in the table indicate that this is
true in our model, if defaults are more frequently triggered by low firm fundamental value than by
low collateral value, which is the case if less short-term debt is used. Hence, negative correlation
has only a minor impact on the total default probability in case of low short-term debt ratios. This
produces the relatively flattened and non-monotonic dependence of the total default probability on
the correlation parameter when short-term debt ratio is relatively small. In this way, Table 2 again
emphasises that the firm’s financing structure has a significant impact on its default risk.
15There is no authoritative data on the use of haircuts/initial margins in the repo market in either Europe or the US.
Table 1 in the research report published by Committee on the Global Financial System Study Group shows margin
data in bilateral interviews in various financial centers with various market users, including banks, prime brokers,
custodians, asset managers, pension funds and hedge funds. For reference see http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs36.pdf
11
[Table 2 about here.]
Remark 6. Extremely high margins ( > 50% ) are very rare events and can be only observed in
the peak of a crisis. We have calculated the probability that this scenario happens at one of the
rollover dates using our baseline parameters and assuming that short-term debt is rolled over every
quarter. In this settng, the likelihood that the margin hits the extreme level of 50% at a rollover
date during a 5 year period is 0.009, 0.022, resp. 0.045 for θ taking 0.05, 0.075, resp. 0.1 .
Note that lowering long-run mean θ is equivalent to reducing the standard deviation of the margin
process. Moreover, a very high margin m does not necessarily imply a default due to illiquidity.
The latter depends not only on the margin but on the collateral quality (1 −m)V . Thus, if the
margin is high but the fundamental value is performing well, a default is less likely.
3.3 Debt Structure and Credit Spread
We now analyse the effect of liquidity shocks on the firm’s credit spread for different debt struc-
tures. To make our results comparable we keep the nominal of total outstanding debt constant to
S+L = 60 monetary units and vary only the ratio of short-term debt over total debt. We calculate
credit spread on aggregate debt by computing the value of long-term debt and periodically rolled
over short-term debt at initial time and then calculating the debt yield on total debt, i.e., in equa-
tion (2.5) we plug in the aggregated value of long-term debt and periodically rolled over short-term
debt DL + DS for debt value, the sum of principal values L + S for the nominal, and the sum
of coupon payments CL + CS for coupon to determine the aggregate debt yield. Afterwards the
credit spread is derived from the debt yield by subtracting the risk-free rate. The induced credit
spread on this hypothetical aggregate debt reflects the total default risk of the firm and depends
on its financing and maturity structure. In Table 3 we report the credit spread for this aggregate
debt and investigate how it changes with varying initial margin. We first consider the base model
with parameters summarized in Table 1 where S/(S + L) = 1/3 . In case of time-varying margin
with initial margin level of 10% and for maturities of long-term debt equal to 2 years, 5 years
and 10 years, we calibrate credit spread of aggregate debt to 230 bps by adjusting the insolvency
bankruptcy barrier B .16 The initial margin of m0 = 10% as a benchmark case reflecting margins
in boom times is then gradually increased first to 20% and then from 20% to 30% . The incre-
ment of 10% corresponds to one standard deviation of the margin process, reflecting the tightened
funding liquidity.
[Table 3 about here.]
The results in Table 3 have interesting implications in various aspects. First, when lending con-
ditions tighten, i.e., when initial margin increases, the credit spread increases across all maturities.
For a firm financed only by 1/3 ( = S/(L + S) ) through short-term debt, funding liquidity has a
minor impact on credit spreads when margin is slightly increasing. For instance in case of 5 years
maturity of long-term debt, the credit spread changes from 230 bps to 254 bps when the initial
margin m0 jumps from 10% to 20% . However, when the market is in distress and margin is
high at m0 = 30% , it has a significant impact on the credit spread which then ascends to 305
16Note that the difference in credit spreads across maturities in the baseline model is caused by simulation errors.
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bps, i.e., a 33% net increase. The credit spread increases even more if a firm is financed through
more collateralized short-term borrowing. The aggregate credit spread when long-term debt has
5-year maturity shoots up to 337 bps corresponding to a 40% net increase, when margin jumps
from 10% to 30% and the firm is financed through 50% short-term collateralized borrowing.
Since initially the firm is remote to insolvency default, it means that even a firm with good quality
of fundamental could be severely hit by liquidity dry-ups in the collateralized short-term lending
market. Furthermore, by comparing credit spreads when margin is constant at 10% (the long-run
mean of margin process) with the corresponding spreads when margin is time-varying starting at
an initial level of 10% , our results in Table 3 show that variations in the margin process have a
significant impact on debt credit spreads even in normal times. We observe e.g. a 30 bps difference
in credit spreads in case of 1/3 short-term debt financing and up to 70 bps difference in case
of 2/3 short-term debt ratio. The difference is the more pronounced if the initial margin level
deviates more from its long-run mean. Thus, we conclude that the time-varying average margin
may well capture the dynamic nature of funding costs that influences firm’s financing decisions.
Second, the credit spread increases the more, the shorter the maturity of long-term debt is.
For T = 2 years, the credit spread for a firm with 2/3 short-term debt ratio could rocket up
to 536 bps, about a 90% net increase, if lending conditions deteriorate and margin increases
from 10% to 30% . A liquidity shock can lead to a significant jump in margin which can then
trigger immediate firm defaults in the early stage as collateralized short-term borrowing becomes
more expensive. A debt structure with shorter long-term debt maturity asks for a higher liquidity
premium on aggregate debt which in turn leads to higher credit spreads. For a debt structure with
longer maturity, the risk premium is averaged out as margin gradually reverts to its long-run mean
of 10% over time. The credit spread is therefore lower for longer maturity debt structures. He
and Xiong (2012) obtain similar results by taking into account the rollover costs at the arrival of
every liquidity shock. According to Bao et al. (2011), the trading costs of corporate bonds more
than quadrupled during the recent financial crisis. Using this size of trading costs, He and Xiong
(2012) derive credit spreads for debt with one year maturity in a range of 750 bps to 800 bps.
Our results are consistent with these findings if the extreme margin level of more than 30% is used
corresponding to a level observed during the peak of the crisis. However, the default mechanism is
different in our model since tighter margin requirements lead to early defaults or runs on short-term
debt in our setting, which in turn results in higher credit spreads over short time horizons.
Finally, the results show that the more a firm is financed through collateralized short-term
borrowing, the worse the firm is hit by a funding liquidity shock. Over-reliance on short-term
funding was a critical factor triggering defaults during the latest financial crisis. Gopalan et al.
(2010) find that firms with more short-term financing are more likely to experience multi-notch
credit rating downgrades. Similarly, our results in Table 3 show that the credit spreads of firms
financed by a large proportion of collateralized short-term debt increase dramatically when margin
tightens, especially when maturity is short. While credit spreads in Table 3 have been calculated
for short-term debt rolling over quarterly, similar results can also be obtained when short-term
debt needs to be rolled over at a different frequency. The results confirm to what has been found in
Liang et al. (2014, 2015) that short-term ratio and debt tenor structure have an impact on firms’
default risk. The higher the rollover frequency is and the more the firm relies on collateralized
short-term funding, the more it is exposed to liquidity risk and hence the higher the firm’s credit
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spread is. Our results also support the findings in Chen et al. (2012) who regress the credit spread
of corporate bonds on the share of long-term bonds close to maturity in 2008 and find a large and
positive beta. They show that a high-leverage firm with short maturity has a much higher credit
spread in a recession. Our model provides some explanation for this effect. In normal times when
margin is low, credit spreads are relatively flat against fluctuations in margin. However, in times
of financial distress when markets experience a substantial increase in margin, our model produces
a big jump in credit spreads. Hence, our model allows a firm to easily conduct stress testing on its
financing structure and its exposure to liquidity shocks in the shadow banking system.
4 Model Implications
4.1 Monetary Policy Implications
Since the financial crisis of 2007/2008 academics and policy makers have started to pay more at-
tention to the important effect of margin requirements in the lending market. Geanakoplos (2010)
claims that the 2007-2008 financial crisis is the bottom of a leverage (margin) cycle. Back to the
1990s, Geanakoplos (1997) already pointed out the importance to manage margins together with
the lending rate in times of market distress in order to provide liquidity. In short terms, when
margin requirement is loose, asset prices go up because buyers can get easy credit and spend more;
when margin requirement is highly constrained, it is difficult to obtain funding and hence prices
drop and credit spreads spike. The policy implication of the leverage (margin) cycle is that the
regulator could cut interest rates and reduce system-wide margins to enhance liquidity in financial
markets. The regulator should seek to maintain margins within a reasonable level in normal times,
stepping in to raise margins in times of distress, and curtail it as investors become pessimistic and
especially during a crisis.
Traditionally, regulators and economists have regarded the interest rate cut as the most impor-
tant policy tool in a crisis. Whenever the economy slows down, central banks lower interest rates.
Lending with a lower margin than the one, that the market is willing to offer to borrowers who
might not repay, is a huge departure from the traditional monetary policy tool. However, as shown
in Geanakoplos (2010), Ashcraft et al. (2010) and Liang et al. (2014), especially in times of crisis,
pushing down margin is far more effective than cutting interest rates because lowering interest rates
implicitly lifts shadow prices of capital and thus its function is limited to certain asset classes. It
is well understood by now that central banks could be managing margins all through the leverage
cycle, and should do so especially in the booming and the recessing periods. Our analysis is based
on the fact that the loose margin requirement introduced by the central bank can effectively reduce
the margin level faced by a firm.
[Figure 4 about here.]
In our model, the margin slightly fluctuates around a level of 10% in normal times. The rever-
sion parameter κ indicates how quickly a high margin level arising from a funding liquidity shock
returns to its normal level. Hence, κ can represent how quickly a regulator intervenes in order
to lower the margin to a reasonable level after a funding liquidity shock has hit. Figure 4 shows
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that the faster the regulator intervenes, the lower is the aggregate credit spread. For example for
κ = 1.5 it takes 116 days to halve the deviation of margin from its long-run mean while this is
reduced to only 44 days when κ = 4 and hence central bank reacts faster. The corresponding
decrease in the credit spread is roughly 110 bps when S/(L + S) = 1/2 . Thus, a fast cut in the
market margin on collateral borrowing can bring down the credit spread very quickly. In addition,
decreasing the volatility of the margin process, e.g., through central banks providing loans at low
haircuts and thereby implicitly introducing bounds on margins, can reduce credit spreads across
different maturities and different financing structures as shown in Figure 5. For example the stan-
dard deviation in the steady state decreases by roughly 80% from 51% to 9.6% when η changes
from 1.7 to 1.2 (assuming κ = 1.5% ). The credit spread then decreases by about 115 bps
for S/(L + S) = 1/2 . Hence, stabilizing lending conditions such as cutting margin and reducing
its variation can effectively lower credit premium. These results underline the important role that
margins play as an additional monetary policy tool. Furthermore, they support the voice echoed
by both academics and regulators that regulators should collect data from a broad spectrum of in-
vestors on the level of margin used to buy various classes of assets and that margin data should be
made transparent. Without such data it is difficult for a firm to implement any reasonable model
that can account for the risk arising from fluctuating margin requirements in the collateralized
lending market.
[Figure 5 about here.]
4.2 Debt Run and Liquidity Premium Discount
The standard structural credit risk models usually assume a flat interest rate benchmark on trea-
sury bills as our model does it too. We already showed in Section 3 that credit spreads vary with
margin requirements. We have observed in Table 3 that an increase in the initial margin implies an
increase in credit spreads across different maturities and financing structures. The increase in some
cases is so significant, more than several hundred bps, that it cannot be explained by a bid-ask
spread. This indicates that the credit spread contains a component induced by funding liquidity.
Such a non-insolvency based component of the credit spread has been extensively reported (see e.g.
Huang and Huang (2003) or Filipović and Trolle (2013))17. In our model, the funding liquidity
component arises from the fact that short-term creditors have an incentive to run on debt service
at every rollover date if their margin requirements cannot be fulfilled. This potentially results in
a firm failure due to illiquidity. To investigate this effect further, we calculate the credit spread
on long-term debt and (collateralized) short-term debt separately, i.e., we have computed the debt
yield in equation (2.5) for long-term debt and periodically rolled over (collateralized) short-term
debt individually and then retrieved the credit spreads for both types of debt. Results are sum-
marized in Table 4. We compare the credit spreads of short- and long-term debt in the case of no
margin requirements to the ones when the initial margin is m0 = 10% , 20% , 30% for various
financing structures. Our results show that the risk premium (credit spread) paid to creditors is
higher in the presence of margin requirements and can be significant when short-term debt ratio is
high. Moreover, the increase in risk premium to the long-term creditors is more severe than that
paid to short-term creditors when the initial margin increases. For instance, when the short-term
debt ratio is 1/3 , the spread for long-term debt increases from 12 to 29 and then to 60 bps
17Based on TRACE bond transactions data, Bao (2009) finds evidence consistent with Huang and Huang (2003).
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compared to an increase from 7 to 23 and then 33 for the short-term debt when the initial
margin jumps from 0 (no margin requirement present) to m0 = 10% , 20% , and then 30%
respectively. The effect is more evident when the short-term debt ratio is higher and debt maturity
is shorter. Therefore, our results support the fact that funding liquidity arising from both financing
structure and debt maturity structure needs to be taken into account in debt valuation.
[Table 4 about here.]
Standard credit risk models used by bond rating agencies ignore the margin requirement and
hence the funding liquidity risk. As earlier mentioned, Danielson et al. (2012) argue that slacking
margin requirement is the same as increasing spread. Thus, the risk premium distributed to credi-
tors is much lower than when the premium would also compensate for this type of risk. Therefore,
if credit spreads are computed in standard structural credit risk models which neglect margin re-
quirements, a liquidity premium should be added on top of the model induced default premium
in order to compensate creditors for rollover risk. This implies that the discount curve should be
decomposable in three components: the risk-free rate, an insolvency/defaultable premium, and a
liquidity premium. He and Xiong (2012) introduce such an idea by considering a flat market liquid-
ity premium taken as a discount rate applying to trade debt in a secondary debt market whenever
a liquidity shock arrives. Our results indicate that a non-flat discount curve should be applied:
a lower liquidity premium should be given to creditors providing short-term funds and a higher
liquidity premium to those creditors providing long-term funds. This idea has been used in terms
of liquidity transfer pricing in practice. The latter rewards a funding liquidity premium to creditors
for using capital and is supported by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Principle 4
in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008b)). Our model supports this idea and provides
insights why such a liquidity premium is important for practical implementation. A theoretical
model to back out the term structure curve of this discount factor seems highly desirable, which
we leave for future research.
5 Conclusion
We propose a structural credit risk model incorporating funding liquidity risk represented by varia-
tions in margin requirements in the collateralized short-term lending market. By modelling margin
as a mean-reverting process, we study firm’s short-term resilience to funding liquidity shocks. In
the long-run, margin fluctuates around a low mean indicating a reasonable level of margin in normal
times. Defaults can be either due to insolvency or triggered by a funding liquidity shock resulting
from changing lending conditions such that the firm’s collateral is not sufficient to roll over short-
term debt. This modelling of default due to a funding liquidity shock can be considered as a run on
short-term debt. It is particularly appealing as it avoids having to deal with the creditors’ binary
decision problem at every rollover date and the associated optimization problems. Default proba-
bilities and credit spreads can easily be calculated numerically in our setting. Therefore, our model
is useful for financial institutions in the shadow banking system, financing medium- to long-term
assets by short-term contracts such as collateralized commercial papers and repos, to quantify their
exposure to funding liquidity risk. Our results show that tightened margin requirements can sig-
nificantly expose a firm to rollover risk, especially for firms heavily relying on short-term financing.
Both financing structure and debt maturity structure significantly affect firm’s default probability
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and credit spread when margin is time-varying. Thus, funding liquidity risk should be taken into
account in firm’s internal risk management as well as in debt pricing. In terms of debt pricing,
an additional premium should be added to the discount curve when evaluating debt in order to
account for rollover risks. Finally, our results have some important policy implications. Our results
indicate that regulators shall maintain a reasonably low margin level to help firms manage maturity
risk and effectively prevent creditors’ maturity rat race. Furthermore, regulators shall intervene
fast to curtail margins in crisis periods, which can be seen as an equally important monetary policy
tool as cutting interest rates in times of financial distress.
While our results show that on individual firm level firm’s can benefit from low margins resulting
from liquidity injection by the government, caution is needed to analyse the effectiveness of low
margin policy of a government bailout in crisis periods in a systematic way. Our approach fails
to capture firm-sovereign contagion risk and moral hazard. Concerning the former, low margin
requirements in the financial sector as a consequence of government bailouts is costly and increases
sovereign credit risk. The deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness in turn negatively impacts the
valuation of firms’ bond portfolios and hence their ability to obtain funding. Such a firm-sovereign
contagion is studied in Acharya et al. (2014). Concerning the latter, bailing firms out in crisis
periods can lead to higher leverage (lower margin) in the next cycle due to moral hazard problems
as argued in Geanakoplos (2010). The author suggests that moral hazard can be controlled and
eliminated if a systemic policy of low margin gives prudent firms a better chance to survive compared
to imprudent firms. Hence, if regulators use margins as additional monitary tool besides interest
rates as strongly advocated by Geanakoplos (2010), it can be highly beneficial for prudent firms to
collect margin data on both securities’ level and investors’ level in order to monitor and manage
margins according to the reasonable level set by regulators.
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A First Passage Time Simulations
Debt evaluation and credit spread calculations are based on Monte Carlo simulation in our model.
To simulate first passage times to default, we choose a partition {s0, s1, . . . , sK} ∈ [0, T ] such that
0 = s0 < s1 < · · · < sK−1 < sK = T and the rollover dates {t1, . . . , tN−1} ⊂ {s0, s1, . . . , sK} . For
such a partition, we sample M paths of (Vsk ,msk) , k = 0, 1, . . . ,K , according to the dynamics
of the firm fundamental (2.1) and the margin (2.2), resp. To determine the default times τi and
τm for each simulated path (V
i
sk
,misk)k=0,1,...,K for i = 1, . . . ,M , for the insolvency default time,
we need to account for a potential over-shooting problem that the firm fundamental may drop
below the barrier between two discretization points sk and sk+1 . To address this, we tie to a
Brownian bridge (see Karatzas and Shreve (1998)). Note that
d lnVt = (rf − 0.5σ2)dt+ σdW 1t .
The probability that the minimum of a Brownian motion (Bs)s≥0 with Bsk = lnVsk and Bsk+1 =











} lnVsk+1 > lnB
0 otherwise.
We make use of this to decide whether a default event has happened between sk and sk+1 . The
following scheme provides the first passage time to the insolvency barrier B for path i .
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(a) Provided that there is no default due to insolvency prior to sk , we set the default time due
to insolvency as
τi = sk
if lnV isk ≤ lnB .
(b) If lnV isk > lnB and lnV
i
sk+1
> lnB , we set b =
sk+1−sk
1−P ik
and generate u from a uniform
distribution in the interval [sk, sk+1 + b] . If u ∈ [sk, sk+1] , then the first passage time to
the barrier occurs in this interval [sk, sk+1] and we set
τi = u.
(c) If u is not in the interval [sk, sk+1] , it implies that there is no insolvency default prior to
time sk+1 . We then move to the next time point sk+1 and repeat the same process starting
from (a) .
The default time due to funding liquidity for path i can be computed as follows. Since a run can
only occur at the rollover dates tn we only need to consider the discretization points sk that
coincide with a rollover date.
(a) Provided that there is no default due to funding liquidity prior to sk , we set the default time






(b) If (1−misk) lnV
i
sk
≥ S , it implies that there is no default at time sk . Thus, we move to the
next time point sk+1 and repeat the same process starting from (a) .
The default time for path i is the minimum of τi and τm . Once the default times have been
determined, we can evaluate debt and calculate default probabilities and credit spreads.
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Figure 1: Simulation of Default Scenarios
The figure shows a simulation of firm fundamental value (Vt)t≥0 (solid) and collateral value ((1−
mt)Vt)t≥0 (dashed). The time points when the firm defaults due to illiquidity and due to insolvency
are marked.
21
Figure 2: Dependence of Default Probability on Initial Margin.
Panel A shows the firm’s total default probability while Panel B illustrates its individual components
separately, the default probability due to funding liquidity Q(τi ≤ T, τi < τm) , and the default
probability due to insolvency Q(τm ≤ T, τm < τi) , for daily and quarterly rollover frequency. The
baseline parameters listed in Table 1 are used, apart from the proportion of short-term debt to
total debt which is set to 1/3 here. Calculations are performed under the risk-neutral measure.
22
Figure 3: Dependence of Default Probability on Initial Margin.
Panel A shows the firm’s total default probability versus the ratio of short-term debt to insolvency
default barrier S/B while Panel B illustrates the individual components separately, i.e., the default
probability due to funding liquidity Q(τi ≤ T, τi < τm) , and the default probability due to
insolvency Q(τm ≤ T, τm < τi) , for quarterly rollover frequency. The baseline parameters listed
in Table 1 are used, apart from the short-term debt S which varies such that S/B changes while B
is kept constant. Calculations are performed under the risk-neutral measure.
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Figure 4: Impact of Speed of Mean Reversion on Credit Spread.
Results are based on the baseline parameters listed in Table I. The initial margin level is chosen at
30% . The short-term debt ratio is fixed as 1/3 (solid), 1/2 (dash-dotted), and 2/3 (dashed), resp.
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Figure 5: Impact of Volatility of Margin on Credit Spread.
Results are based on the baseline parameters listed in Table I. The short-term debt ratio is fixed
as 1/3 (solid), 1/2 (dash-dotted), and 2/3 (dashed), resp.
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Table 1: Baseline Parameters
Firm Characteristic
Initial firm fundamental V0 = 100
Volatility of firm fundamental σ = 25%
Bankruptcy recovery rate R = 50%
Insolvency threshold B = 44.58
Debt Structure
Uncollateralized long-term debt principal L = 40
Long-term debt coupon CL = 3.8
Maturity of long-term debt T = 5 years
Collateralized short-term debt principal S = 20
Short-term debt coupon CS = 1.8
Short-term debt rollover frequency ∆t = 3 months
Margin
Initial margin m0 = 10%
Speed of mean-reversion of margin κ = 1.5
Long-run mean of margin θ = 10%
Volatility of margin η = 120%
Correlation parameter ρ = −0.5
Macro Variables
Risk-free interest rate rf = 3%
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Table 2: Default probability and correlation
The table reports the total default probability Q(τ ≤ T ) and default probability due to funding
liquidity Q(τi ≤ T, τi < τm) for different correlations ρ between the firm fundamental value and
the margin process for quarterly rollover frequency. Parameters are chosen according to Table 1.





Total PD 0.159 0.166 0.165 0.167 0.166 0.173





Total PD 0.172 0.178 0.175 0.190 0.183 0.172





Total PD 0.232 0.232 0.227 0.216 0.207 0.198






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Credit Spreads for Long- and Short-Term Debt
The table reports credit spreads for both long-term (uncollateralized) debt and periodically rolled
over short-term (collateralized) debt for different levels of initial margin and different financing
structures. The parameters are chosen according to Table 1.





Long-term 302 314 343 403





Long-term 351 365 422 879





Long-term 447 461 566 696
Short-term 160 162 200 257
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